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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between network structure and risk perceptions. We use 
self-report data on 359 illicit marijuana growers and their personal co-worker networks. Our 
results show that growers with more structural holes in their co-worker network perceive higher 
risk of apprehension from law enforcement. We argue that this result is facilitated by two 
mechanisms: 1) the amount and quality of information available to growers about risks and 
detection pt of vicarious deterrence; 
and, 2) the trust inherent in their network and the -awareness of their own network 
 (  network closure as a 
protective factor. 
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Introduction 
According to deterrence theory, people rationally choose to commit crime by deliberately 
weighing costs and benefits. Since the inception of the theory, many scholars have argued that 
the power of deterrence 
of punishment (Andenaes, 1974; Geerken & Gove, 1975; Gibbs, 1975; Waldo & Chiricos, 1972; 
Zimring & Hawkins, 1973). Nagin (1998) summarized this body of survey-based perceptual 
deterrence studies and concluded that criminality is lower among those who perceive a higher 
likelihood of apprehension. Thus, it can be said that an inherent part of deterrence theory is 
perceptual (Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1983).  
  While criminological researchers agree that perceived risk of apprehension is an 
important construct to consider when constructing public policy based on deterrence and the 
threat of legal sanctions, they have been relatively unsuccessful in isolating its correlates and 
explaining individual variance (Piquero, Gertz, Bratton, & Loughran, 2012).  Variables 
traditionally considered when examining perceived risk of apprehension include legal sanctions 
(general deterrence), direct experience with law enforcement (specific deterrence), and offender 
demographics (Gibbs, 1975). It was not until 1993, when Stafford and Warr reconceptualized 
traditional deterrence theory,  
Criminological theory is rife with images of social network influence over criminal 
behavior; concepts like social bonding, cohesion and control, opportunity structures, diffusion, 
trust, and peer influence
to commit crimes (Papachristos, 2011: 102-102). Deterrence theory was absent this influence 
until Stafford and Warr integrated deterrence doctrine and social learning theory to form their 
concept of vicarious deterrence (1993). Vicarious deterrence occurs when an individual bases 
their judgement about the certainty of legal 
activity (Paternoster & Piquero, 1995; Stafford & Warr, 1993).  
Qualitative research has provided some guidance in understanding how offenders share 
information. For example, Patricia Adler (1993) interviewed drug dealers in the US Southwest. 
She found that dealers use networks of friends and acquaintances to build their business. In 
reference to vicarious deterrence, these networks share information about perceived risks from 
police and other dealers. Mohamed and Fritsvold (2010) found similar results, explaining how 
networks of dealers share information about formal and informal threats. Jacques and Wright 
(2015) show that communication fueling drug markets operates like a contagion through 
electronic and in-person interactions. These messages flow through the market from producers, 
to traffickers, to consumers, and back again.  
Research testing the explanatory power of vicarious deterrence has found mixed results. 
A key explanation for such contradictory results is the difficulty operationalizing vicarious 
deterrence. Quantitative studies have struggled in translating qualitative results into valid 
measures. Studies contradicting Stafford and Warr used data obtained by surveying student 
populations using hypothetical scenarios (Piquero & Paternoster, 1998; Piquero & Pogarsky, 
2002; Sitren & Applegate, 2006; 2012) rather than from self-reports of actual criminal activity. 
The only study to unequivocally support Stafford and Warr
deterrence and perceived risk used data from self-reports and operationalized vicarious 
deterrence as overall knowledge of 
addition, previous research has treated individuals independently, instead of being embedded in 
examined as possible proxies for vicarious deterrence. This omission should be addressed in 
of security and perception of risk.  
This study fills a gap in the research in three ways. First, we take a new approach to 
operationalizing vicarious deterrence by using social network variables designed to measure 
Second, instead of using student samples, we test vicarious deterrence and risk perceptions using 
a study population of recently or currently active marijuana growers. Third, we move beyond 
hypothetical scenarios of criminal experiences and use a self-report survey designed to capture 
perceptions and personal co-worker network. Addressing these gaps should 
help clarify the relationship between vicarious deterrence, network structure, and risk 
perceptions. 
 
Deterrence 
Empirical support for the effect of vicarious deterrence on perceived certainty of 
punishment is mixed, at best. Paternoster and Piquero (1995) tested and expanded Stafford and 
of deterrence theory by studying how knowledge of 
criminal activity (illicit substance use), which acts as an indirect operationalization of 
vicarious punishment/avoidance, affects perceived certainty of apprehension for 
drinking and marijuana use. They found a positive relationship between these two variables, 
Piquero and Paternoster (1998) extended this line of 
inquiry exploring how , and an 
estimation of how likely those convicted of drunk driving get the prescribed punishment 
(vicarious punishment avoidance),  Contrary 
ey found vicarious punishment increased criminal intentions 
and vicarious punishment avoidance decreased criminal intentions. Piquero and Pogarsky (2002) 
and Sitren and Applegate (2006) vicarious punishment) and 
percentage of peers who had driven drunk without detection (vicarious punishment avoidance) 
on intentions to drive after drinking. Both studies found that vicarious punishment avoidance 
decreased perceptions of risk, supporting the theory; but vicarious punishment also decreased 
perceptions of risk, contradicting Stafford and Warr. Replicating this research but extending to 
an offender population, Sitren and Applegate (2012) surveyed inmates using the same 
methodology as Piquero and Pogarsky (2002). Their results once again contradicted the theory, 
showing that vicarious punishment was associated with a lower perceived risk of apprehension. 
The contradictory nature of this research leads us to consider other factors that impact 
of risk depends upon the interplay between two mechanisms: 1) the amount of information an 
individual has on their social network  the efficiency or inefficiency of law 
enforcement (Paternoster & Piquero, 1995)
mechanism is guided by vicarious deterrence, while the second mechanism is rooted in ideas on 
network closure and structural holes (Burt, 2005; Coleman, 1988). 
 
Network Structure and Risk Perception 
In 1988, Coleman introduced the network closure argument which states that network 
density can increase social capital by doing two important things: 1) it increases access to 
accurate information by reducing the number of intermediaries through which communication 
enforcing group norms and cooperation. 
The latter advantage built upon Granovetter  (1981) argument that in situations where 
individuals face the threat of sanctions, trust is more likely between people who have mutual 
friends. In 1992, Ron Burt challenged the network closure argument, stating that social capital is 
created when an individual is able to broker between otherwise disconnected people. He used the 
term structural hole to describe the lack of connection between actors in a network. However, he 
later acknowledges that the two perspectives actually apply to different problems  dense 
networks are more adaptable for situations needing collective action and trust, and individuals 
brokering over structural holes are better able to gain access to specialized groups/knowledge 
and increase profit. Brass, Butterfield, and Skaggs (1998) elaborated on the trust generated 
through network closure, proposing that every structural hole in a network presents an 
opportunity for unethical behavior.  
What unites this body of work is the protective features that closed networks have for 
individuals embedded within them. Lin (2001) conceptualized this idea as the expressive returns 
of social capital. Expressive returns of social capital have been measured mainly through trust, 
support (Son & Lin, 2008), social control in the form of discouraging malfeasance (e.g., Colvin, 
Cullen, & Vander Ven, 2002; Wright & Fitzpatrick, 2006), but also in avoiding detection in a 
sample of young offenders (Bouchard and Nguyen, 2010). Much like Burt, Lin (1999) argues 
that closed networks with homophilous ties (contacts with similar characteristics and resources) 
reinforce the preservation of resources because it increases solidarity and trust whereas extended 
networks with heterophilous interactions (contacts with dissimilar characteristics and resources) 
are more likely to aid in the acquisition of resources (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990; Granovetter, 
1981; Lin, 1999, 2001).  
Interestingly, criminologists working with social network analysis have conflicting views 
on the benefits of closure in criminal networks. These researchers suggest that criminal networks 
have to balance the need for efficient business connections and communication with security and 
secrecy due to the inherently hostile environment in which criminals operate, where the criminal 
justice system works to inhibit individuals profiting from criminal enterprise (Baker & Faulkner, 
1993; Morselli, Giguere & Petit, 2006). This security-efficiency trade-off is moderated by the 
money tend to favor efficiency, while networks with more ideological goals or a longer time to 
act favor security (Morselli et al., 2006: 144). Some research on drug trafficking networks shows 
that secure networks appear to be higher in network closure (Calderoni et al., 2014; Duijn et al., 
2014, Mainas, 2012; Xu & Chen, 2008).  However, conflicting research has found that as law 
enforcement targeting and seizures increase, the network structure reduces density to protect 
members (Morselli, 2010; Morselli & Petit, 2007; Tenti & Morselli, 2014). None of these studies 
examined perceptions of risks, the main goal of this study. 
 
Current Study 
The current study is the first, to our knowledge, to examine the connection between 
criminal network structure and perceived risk of apprehension. Specifically, we operationalize 
vicarious deterrence using social network variables designed to measure access to information 
and security and assess their effect 
marijuana growing.  
Our guiding research question asks: Is there a relationship between network structure 
and risk perceptions? We argue that the relationship between network structure and risk 
perception is facilitated by two mechanisms. Neither mechanism predicts that individuals would 
perceive high risks of detection. After all, by having already decided to participate, our growers 
believe that risks are low enough as to make it worth their while to get involved. Given this, we 
first posit that risks perceptions depend on how much information is available to growers about 
risks and detection, which is itself dependent on how many unique growers one knows. The 
larger the number of non-redundant contacts, the higher the likelihood of learning about (the 
otherwise rare instances) in which other growers have been detected. In emphasizing the 
channels of information from which growers learn about risks, the first mechanism uses guidance 
concept of vicarious deterrence (1993).   
A second mechanism highlights not how growers actually learn about or acquire new 
-awareness of their own network 
position. Growers embedded in more cohesive, strong tie networks may feel more secure by 
virtue of their network composition. The more trusted the ties to other growers, the lower the 
perception that things can/will go wrong. Similarly, the more non-redundant ties, the lower the 
level of trust, the higher the likelihood that risk perceptions will be adjusted upwards. In framing 
(2005) ideas on network closure as a p
expressive social capital (2001).  
It may be that these perceptions do not materialize. If we learned anything from the 
efficiency/security literature, it is that offenders embedded in less cohesive networks may be at 
lower risks of detection (Morselli, 2010). Yet, the focus of this study is on the relationship 
between network structure and perceptions, for a low detection activity in which all respondents 
decided to participate.  
 
Data and Methods 
In order to study the relationship between perceived risk of apprehension and network-
based vicarious deterrence we use data from an anonymous international web survey of cannabis 
cultivators. Online survey methods are particularly well-suited to study this population due to 
their covert nature (Potter and Chatwin, 2011; Barratt et al., 2012; Barratt et al., 2015). 
Participants were primarily recruited through advertisements on websites related to marijuana 
cultivation, college campus advertisements, and advertising in cannabis magazines (for more 
detail on the recruitment methods see Barratt et al., 2012 and Potter et al., 2015). Former and 
current growers over the age of 17 were recruited from eleven countries with data collection 
commencing in early 2012 and ending in 2013 (Barratt et al., 2012; Potter et al., 2015). The core 
survey (Decorte et. al., 2012) contained 58 questions on  marijuana cultivation 
experiences, reasons for growing, contact with the criminal justice system, and demographics. In 
addition to this core survey, extra modules were added by researchers from different countries to 
reflect different research interests.  Important to the current paper, growers from Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and the United States were also asked about their growing networks.  
Criminological network literature usually quantifies the security/efficiency trade-off and 
information exchange at the whole network level  roughly, the extent to which actors are 
embedded in social structures and how these structures affect network functioning. However, if 
we want to understand individual variation in behavior and perception, we need to describe how 
individuals are embedded in local social structures  ego networks (Freeman, 1982). To capture 
grower ego networks, each grower was asked to think about the people with whom they had ever 
worked (partners, bosses, employees, other significant people). They were then asked to list the 
top five most significant people, using pseudonyms. In order to build alter connections, the 
respondents were asked whether each of the above named co-workers had worked with one 
another (co-worker ego network with alter ties). 
Sample 
We restrict our analyses to individuals residing in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the 
United States who reported illicitly growing cannabis in the past five years and had networks of 
two or more alters. This was done for three reasons. First, because sanctions change over time, it 
is important that the time an individual participated in cultivation is consistent with state or 
country laws and penalties for cultivation. Second, because we are interested in perceived risk of 
police apprehension, legal medical growers must be removed as they should perceive no risk 
from law enforcement for engaging in a legal activity. Finally, because we use two measures of 
structural holes that are based on alter redundancy, we need to have a minimum ego network size 
of two. The selection criteria narrowed the original sample in each country substantially (see 
Table 1 for breakdown of sample by country). Of this sample, there are 359 cases that contain 
valid data on perceived risk of apprehension. To better understand the ramifications of sample 
selection, we compared the overall sample (n=1987) to the current sample (n=359) on all of the 
model variables excluding network variables. The only significant difference was in the number 
of plants, where the current sample had significantly larger growing operations.     
 ~insert Table 1 about here ~ 
 
Dependent variable: 
Perceived certainty of arrest: To measure perceived certainty of arrest, subjects were asked 
What do you estimate is the risk of you getting caught by police for growing cannabis? The 
original variable was coded on a four-item Likert scale from 0=very low risk to 4= very high 
risk. The distribution of the original variable was negatively skewed, with the following 
responses:  47.3% = very low risk, 33.9% = low risk, 10.1% high risk, and .3% very high risk. 
We recoded the responses on a binary scale where 0 = low or very low risk and 1 = high or very 
high risk. The average perceived certainty rating was 0.13, suggesting generally low risk 
perceptions (see Table 2 for sample descriptives). 
Network-based vicarious deterrence variables: 
Measures of structural holes (Burt, 1992) are well-suited to represent vicarious deterrence 
and network closure. We use three variables to measure structural holes and grower networks: 
Effective size: Effective size measures 
degree and subtracting the average degree of the alters.  If none of the alters are connected, then 
size is one. The equation for effective size is: 
 
Where i = ego, j = alter, and q  calculates the ego network redundancy. The 
higher the effective size, the more structu
acts as a broker, and the more information available to the grower. Effective size ranges from 1 
to 5 (due to limiting the co-worker network at 5), with an average of 2.2. The variable is 
normally distributed.   
Efficiency:  This 
-redundant. A 
grower can have many structural holes (effective) without having a high proportion of non-
redundant ties (efficient), and conversely an actor can be efficient without being effective.  
Network size: The third social network variable is a simple measure of the number of alters/co-
 Network size ranges from 2 to 5, with an average of 3.1 co-
workers. The variable is normally distributed. 
Constraint: Constraint measures the extent to which the ego is invested in alters who are invested 
in one another (Burt, 1992). An ego is constrained if their alters are highly connected because 
they can communicate and broker with one another rather than with the ego. The equation for 
constraint is: 
 
Where i = ego, j = alter, and q  Constraint ranges from 0 to 1.125, with an average of 
0.65. The variable is normally distributed.   
Direct deterrence variables: 
We have two variables that tap into direct deterrence:  
General country/state punitiveness:  Data regarding country/state penalties were gathered from a 
variety of sources. We used the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws 
website (http://norml.org/) to gather data for the United States, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 
These websites detail state/country laws and penalties for marijuana cultivation. We constructed 
a measure that captures the general punitiveness of penalties for cultivation by taking the 
minimum prison sentence. Similar to Nguyen, Malm and Bouchard (2015), we use the minimum 
prison sentence for cultivation for two main reasons. First, the minimum legislated penalty 
provides a baseline that we can use to compare across jurisdictions. Second, the majority of the 
growers who participated in the survey are small-scale growers who are more likely to consider 
minimum than maximum penalties in their risk calculations. According to deterrence theory, we 
would expect that growers in states/countries that are more punitive will perceive a higher risk of 
apprehension.  
A total of 44 states are represented in our sample from the United States. The penalties 
for cannabis cultivation are federally determined in Belgium and the Netherlands; therefore, all 
growers from these countries were subjected to the same minimum prison sentence for 
cultivation. Similar to Nguyen et al., (2015) and Ouellet, Bouchard and Malm (2016), the 
punitiveness variable is represented by the minimum number of days of incarceration for a 
cultivation offense and ranged from 0 days (Belgium and the Netherlands) to approximately 
7,300 days (Kansas) for a cultivation offense. While this variable is positively skewed, no 
transformation was conducted since there is no assumption about normality on independent 
variables in binary logistic regression modeling. 
Police contact: Research shows that an offender perception of the risk is affected by their arrest 
experiences (Anwar and Loughran, 2011). Therefore, we include a binary measure to indicate 
whether or not an individual self-reported ever being arrested for marijuana cultivation. This 
number was relatively low, with only approximately 11% of our sample reporting contact with 
the police for cultivation.  
Control variables: 
We include a number of control variab  
experience and demographic characteristics.  
Number of plants: Since research shows a positive relationship between cultivation size 
and the risk of detection (Bouchard, 2007), it is important to control for the average number of 
plants per crop. We hypothesize that growers would perceive a greater risk of apprehension the 
larger their cultivation site; however, not all research supports this hypothesis (Nguyen et al., 
2015).  The average number of plants is 10.5, with a median of 5 plants. While this variable is 
positively skewed, no transformation was conducted since there is no assumption about 
normality on independent variables in binary logistic regression modeling. 
Experience: In order to control for a grower s skill in cultivation, we control for the amount of 
experience they have with cannabis cultivation (Bouchard and Nguyen 2010; Nguyen and 
Bouchard, 2013).  Subjects were asked how many crops of marijuana he/she has grown thus far. 
Our sample, on average, has grown 2.5 crops at the time of the survey was conducted.  
Type of site: Research has shown that indoor sites are less susceptible to detection than outdoor 
operations (National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009); therefore, we control for whether the site 
was indoor with a binary indicator where 1= indoor and 0= outdoor or both indoor and outdoor. 
The majority of growers in our sample had indoor sites (54%). 
Age: The average age of subjects in our sample is approximately 28 years. 
Gender: Males in our sample were coded = 1 and females = 0. Approximately 88% of our 
sample is male.  
~insert Table 2 about here ~ 
Analytic plan:  
Our control variables contained few missing values and in order to avoid data loss due to 
listwise deletion, we estimated models using multiple imputation with SPSS. The variable with 
the most missing values was number of plants, which had 12 cases with missing values 
(approximately 3%).  
First, we examine the bivariate relationship between all our variables. Due to skew and 
is calculated for cultivation severity, number of plants, and 
experience. Pearson  product-moment correlation coefficients and point biserial correlations are 
calculated where appropriate. Second, we run a series of seven nested logistic regression models. 
The first model tests the effect of control variables on perceived risk. The next model includes 
the two variables measuring direct deterrence and the controls. The next four models measure the 
effect of vicarious deterrence on perceived risk, beginning with network size and successively 
adding each of the structural hole variables. Finally, we run the complete model with all of the 
explanatory variables, accounting for the control variables. 
 
Results 
As shown in the correlation matrix (Table 3), our dependent variable, perceived certainty 
of apprehension, is moderately positively correlated with the social network-based vicarious 
deterrence variables effective size (rpb=.190, p<.01), efficiency (rpb=.112, p<.05), and constraint 
(rpb=-.168, p<.01), but not network size. This result is particularly interesting considering both 
effective size and constraint have a moderate to strong correlation with network size (r=.595, 
p<.01; r=-.461, p<.01 respectively). This supports using four separate social network indicators 
in the statistical models. Expectedly, the three structural hole variables are highly intercorrelated. 
Of notable concern is the strong correlation (r=-.784, p<.01) between effective size and 
constraint; however, we decided to keep both variables in the model based on theoretical and 
published precedent (Burt, 1992). As for the direct deterrence variables, perceived certainty of 
apprehension is not correlated with cultivation severity or police contact. Looking at our control 
variables, perceived certainty is positively related to number of plants (rs=.169, p<.01), 
experience (rs=.144, p<.01), and age (rpb=.138, p<.05).   
Some interesting inter-correlations include the positive relationship between effective 
size and number of plants (rs=.126, p<.05) and experience (rs=.147, p<.01) suggesting that 
larger, more experienced growers have more structural holes in their network. It also appears that 
growers with higher efficiency are also more likely to grow indoors (rpb=.127, p<.05). 
have larger grows (rs=-.113, p<.05) and more experience (rs=-.125, p<.05). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, growers with larger co-worker networks have more experience (rs=.128, p<.05). 
More unexpected is the finding that growers residing in areas with higher sanctions have larger 
co-worker networks (rs=.104, p<.05) larger operations (rs=.285, p<.01), more experience 
(rs=.112, p<.05), and are more likely to grow indoors (rs=.206, p<.01). The correlations between 
police contact and control variables are not unexpected - growers who have been in contact with 
the police due to their cultivation activity have larger operations (rs=.171, p<.01), more 
experience (rs=.216, p<.01) and are older (rpb=.170, p<.01).  
 
~insert Table 3 about here ~ 
 
 Table 4 shows the binary logistic regression results for perceived threat of apprehension.  
Model 1 includes only the control variables. 
negatively associated with perceived risk. Growing indoors is also negatively associated with 
perceived risk. Model 2 examines the effect of direct deterrence on perceived risk. Neither 
sanction severity nor contact with police appear to be associated with perceived risk. However, 
the model does show growers with more experience have higher risk perceptions.  
 Models 3 through 6 measure the effect of vicarious deterrence on perceived risk, 
beginning with network size and successively adding each of the structural hole variables. 
Including just network size and control variables, Model 3 shows the only significant predictor 
of perceived risk to be experience. Once we include the other three structural hole variables in 
Models 4 through 6, we get stable results. Each of these models show network size, effective 
size, experience, and growing indoors as significant predictors. Growers who perceive higher 
risk of apprehension have smaller networks with larger effective size (more structural holes). 
These growers are also more experienced and are less likely to grow indoors. 
Model 7 includes all of our network-based vicarious deterrence variables, direct 
deterrence variables, and our control variables. Effective size and network size remain significant 
and in the previously stated directions. One of our control variables remains a significant 
predictor of perceived risk: experience with growing. Respondents who had more experience 
with growing were more likely to perceive higher risks of apprehension. Network efficiency, 
constraint, both direct deterrence measures, average number of plants, growing indoors, and 
demographic characteristics of the grower are not associated with perceived risks of 
apprehension. The Cox & Snell pseudo-R2 for the complete model is .143, indicating a relatively 
robust fit.  
In sum, interpretation of the log odds results from the logistic regression analyses indicate 
that network-based vicarious deterrence has a significant effect on perceived risk. For every 
additional structural h odds of perceiving high risk of apprehension 
increases by 226%. This result contrasts with the finding that a general increase of one individual 
53%. This result holds true controlling for 
direct deterrence, site characteristics, and respondent demographics.   
 
~ Table 4 about here ~ 
 
Discussion 
This research extends the application of network-based vicarious deterrence to the 
perception of risk. The findings show that among illicit cannabis cultivators who work with two 
or more individuals, those with more structural holes in their networks perceive a greater risk of 
apprehension by law enforcement. The more non-redundant contacts in a network, the higher the 
likelihood of perceiving higher risks of detection from cultivation activities. The analyses 
negative and 
significant association between pure network size and perceived risks once both measures were 
accounted for. These combined findings support the hypotheses laid out in the front end of the 
study and highlight the importance of tie redundancy and trust when examining perceived risk.  
It was proposed that growers who bridge more structural holes have access to more 
growers and as such, more information on risks and detection in the industry.  The negative 
association between network size and risk perception emphasizes how simple access to growers 
81) work on weak ties 
 They are also, by definition, embedded in 
networks where trust levels are assumed to be lower than other, strong tie networks. Growers in 
large, cohesive networks appear to feel more protected than growers in large networks of weak 
ties; this supports the network closure argument (Burt, 2005; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001).While 
we offer support for both mechanisms, the data are not amenable to testing whether the findings 
are driven by information channels where growers learn about risks (Stafford and Warr, 1993), 
or whether this is merely an issue of network structure and trust (Coleman, 1988; Burt, 2005; 
Lin, 2001), or a combination of the two. Future research should tease apart these two 
tual deterrence within 
social networks, a fruitful avenue to broaden the boundaries (and explanatory power) of 
deterrence theory.  
While not a central focus of this study, it is worth noting that the findings for direct 
deterrence appear to contradict deterrence theory. Neither severity of sentencing or direct police 
contact was associated with risk perceptions in model 2 or the complete model. Since we restrict 
our sample to active growers who were not initially deterred, it is possible that the direct effect of 
perceptual deterrence might act as a gatekeeper of sorts. People who risk growing marijuana in 
areas with high sanctions likely see themselves as more skillful and better able to evade 
authorities. Personality traits such as impulsivity, which we are not able to control using this 
data, may also act as an intervening factor.  
The finding that increased cultivation experience leads to an increased perception of risk 
might at first seem contradictory, as more skill should imbue the grower with a sense of 
confidence and ability to successfully evade authorities. At the same time, experienced growers 
are also more likely to have had contacts with the police, and to bridge more structural holes, 
both which could have led to perception of risks be adjusted upwards. With experience also 
comes the knowledge of all the ways in which things can go wrong, including the potential for 
detection (Bouchard and Nguyen, 2011).  
This study has three notable limitations. First, in interpreting these results, it should be 
kept in mind that the analysis suffered from a temporal issue. It is conceivable that perceptions 
are formed first, independent of the network, and that the nature of such perceptions structure the 
type of network in which individuals are embedded. Second, it is not possible to generalize our 
findings to other illicit networks, or even other groups of marijuana growers. Growers who are 
willing to respond to online surveys may be selectively different from those who do not respond.  
Further, self-selection bias is likely to have implications on the internal validity of our results. 
Our sample consisted mostly of small-scale growers who were willing to participate in an 
anonymous online survey and this would most likely reduce perceptions of risk. It is likely that 
growers with a high risk perception would be deterred from completing an online survey. Future 
research should gather information through different sampling strategies targeting growers with 
more commercial motivations. Finally, the network generator limited co-workers to a maximum 
of five. This was done in order to maximize response rate and minimize confusion.  However, it 
is possible that this boundary artificially reduced the number of co-workers and variance in the 
structural hole measures. That said, the mean network size (3.1) and standard deviation (1.23) do 
not indicate that this would be a major issue for this type of sample. 
 
Conclusion 
This study highlights the importance of social network structure on risk perceptions. 
Using a self-report survey of marijuana cultivators, we show that growers with more structural 
holes in their co-worker network perceive higher risks of apprehension from law enforcement. 
Specifically, our research suggests growers who broker over structural holes have access to more 
information on risks and detection in the industry. This likely increases the low risk perception 
that initiated their criminal activity. These growers are also embedded in networks with lower 
trust  growers in large, cohesive networks appear to accurately feel more protected than growers 
in large networks of weak ties. These results further support ed 
 and risks specifically, and to self-report 
surveys more generally.  
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